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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1299
___________
DAWN MARIE BALL,
Appellant
v.

C.O. ODEN; C.O. REED; C.O. PINARD; SGT. RAGAR; C.O. WOLFORD; C.O.
GAIR; LT. HUMMEL; C.O. KEEN; C.O. FOULDS; SGT. GRINER; SGT.
CAMPBELL; CAPT. ROBENOLT; LT. GRIDLEY; SGT. WINDER; LT. BLESSING;
LT. SISLEY; TROY EDWARDS; EISWERTH; C.O. SMITH; DEPUTY SMITH; LT.
CRAVER; D. MILLER; REEDING; T. PETERSON; KOLENO; KOPSHINA;
CIPHAM; SUPT. LAMAS; SECY. BEARD; C.O. AIKEY; C.O. ECKROTH; C.O
NOLTE; C.O. BAKER; LT. BARTO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00847)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 14, 2011
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 28, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Dawn Ball appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her
complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the order under a
plenary standard of review. See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d
187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009). As discussed below, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand.
Ball, who was formerly confined at the State Correctional Institution at Muncy,
Pennsylvania, has sued over 30 prison employees (collectively, “the Muncy defendants”),
as well as Jeffrey Beard, the secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ball claims that the Muncy defendants wrongly (1) confiscated
and destroyed her personal property, (2) searched her cell, (3) prevented her from
accessing the courts, and (4) obstructed her right to send out and receive mail. The
District Court dismissed all of Ball’s claims, concluding that she had failed to state a
claim on which relief could be granted. The Court granted Ball permission to amend her
complaint as to her access-to-the-courts claim, but Ball did not do so. Therefore, on
January 4, 2011, the District Court dismissed Ball’s complaint. Ball then filed a timely
notice of appeal. She has also requested that the Court appoint counsel to represent her.
We agree with the District Court’s disposition of the majority of Ball’s claims. As
an initial matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit for monetary damages against state
officials sued in their official capacities. See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir.
1990). Therefore, Ball’s claims that seek money damages from the defendants in their
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official capacities fail as a matter of law.
Further, although Ball has named as defendants Beard and Marirosa Lamas, the
superintendent of Muncy, she has failed to allege that those individuals were personally
involved in the alleged misconduct. Instead, she seeks to hold them liable solely on the
basis of their supervisory positions. See Compl. at 4, 8. However, “[a] defendant in a
civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot
be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Thus, Ball’s claims against these defendants are not
viable under § 1983.
We will also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Ball’s claims concerning the
confiscation or destruction of her property. Deprivation of inmate property by prison
officials does not state a cognizable due process claim if the prisoner has an adequate
post-deprivation state remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
Adequate remedies were available here: Ball could have filed a state tort action, see id. at
535, or used the prison’s grievance process, see Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr., 221
F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000).
Likewise, we discern no error in the District Court’s analysis of Ball’s claim that
her prison cell was searched without justification. As the Supreme Court has held, “the
Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the
confines of the prison cell.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
Finally, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Ball’s access-to-the3

courts claim. To prevail on such a claim, Ball must show that the denial of access caused
actual injury; for instance, that she was prevented from asserting a “nonfrivolous” and
“arguable” claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Ball has failed to
plead such an injury. We note also that Ball has been able to litigate numerous other
actions during this time period, which further undercuts her claim. See Wilson v. Prasse,
404 F.2d 1380, 1381 (3d Cir. 1968) (“[T]he many civil actions instituted by appellant in
the federal and state courts supported the conclusion of the District Court that the
contention that appellant had been denied access to the court was frivolous.”).
While we agree with the analysis in the District Court’s memorandum, we observe
that the Court did not address Ball’s allegations that the Muncy defendants interfered
with her incoming and outgoing mail. A prison’s interference with a prisoner’s mail can,
in certain circumstances, violate the prisoner’s First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Nasir
v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 2003). We will remand for the District Court to
determine in the first instance whether the complaint sufficiently states a First
Amendment claim, and if not, whether leave to amend should be provided.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order to the extent that it
dismissed Ball’s claims (i) for money damages against the defendants in their official
capacities, (ii) against Beard and Lamas, (iii) concerning the confiscation and destruction
of her property, (iv) concerning cell searches, and (v) concerning her access to the courts.
We will vacate the order, however, to the extent that it dismissed Ball’s complaint
without addressing whether she has stated a First Amendment claim based on the
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defendants’ alleged interference with her mail, and will remand to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also deny Ball’s request for the
appointment of counsel. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993)
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